Nota introductoria al lector
Este ensayo propone una revisión filosófica del concepto de “inconsciente” a partir de cuatro tradiciones clave: Hartmann, Freud, Jung y Lacan. En lugar de concebirlo como entidad ontológica, se lo interpreta como una estrategia explicativa frente a aquello que escapa al pensamiento. Nombrar lo incierto como sistema revela una necesidad epistemológica que merece ser interrogada.
La investigación no pretende negar el valor clínico ni cultural de estas teorías, sino cuestionar los fundamentos que las sostienen: ¿qué se pierde cuando el impacto se convierte en estructura y la afectación en técnica? Desde esta perspectiva, el ensayo desplaza el foco desde el contenido oculto hacia el modo de aparición del inconsciente, entendiendo su manifestación como presencia sin inscripción.
Para ilustrar este giro, se recurre a ejemplos como el delfín, cuyas modulaciones psíquicas ocurren sin narrativa simbólica, revelando que la vivencia no depende de la simbolización. Finalmente, se explora la posibilidad de que lo emergente desde la interioridad no remita a lo propio, sino a presencias relacionales no localizables. Así, se propone una ontología sensible del psiquismo: una concepción del inconsciente como horizonte epistémico, que apuesta por la escucha abierta antes que por la clausura explicativa.
Abstract
Title: The Unconscious as Epistemic Limit: A Transversal Critique of Hartmann, Freud, Jung and Lacan
This essay undertakes a philosophical critique of four traditions that have conceptualized the unconscious as an entity—Hartmann, Freud, Jung, and Lacan—and analyzes how each, within its theoretical framework, attempts to give form to that which escapes thought. Based on this review, it proposes a reinterpretation of the unconscious not as a hidden substance, but as a manifestation that exerts influence without revealing its origin: an experience that transforms without being representable.
The alternative proposal shifts the focus from an ontology of content to an epistemology of appearance. The unconscious is conceived as a cognitive horizon where phenomena erupt that resist naming and appropriation. This notion is grounded in a relational approach to the psyche, which acknowledges that “the internal” is not always one’s own, and that consciousness may be traversed by presences without a locatable origin.
The text also examines the clinical implications of conceiving the unconscious as a closed structure, as well as the proliferation of incompatible theories that may respond more to a need for closure than to a legitimate plurality. Finally, it includes an illustrative example—the dolphin affected by time without conceptualizing it symbolically—which helps to think through the difference between being modulated by something and being able to narratively represent it.
The essay does not offer definitive answers, but rather opens a critical space: to think of the unconscious as that which insists without belonging, and whose meaning does not need to be found, but listened to.
